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Law enforcement agencies in Texas and across the United States have been 
routinely negatively exposed for the continued employment of officers who are deemed 
unfit for duty due to documented ethical issues.  These officers are not only a detriment 
to their agency’s public trust, but they are also not fit to testify as witnesses in court 
proceedings.  A United States Supreme Court decision, Brady v. Maryland (1963) 
supported the aforementioned statements and although around for several years, it 
seems to be creating havoc in law enforcement agencies within the last decade.  Under 
this Supreme Court decision, it states that both peace officers and prosecutors have an 
affirmative duty to disclose all exculpatory evidence to the accused, including peace 
officers with integrity issues.  These officers are commonly referred to as “Brady 
Officers.”  Examples include officers who commit an act of premeditated, dishonest, and 
malevolent conduct, which includes criminal actions.   
Consequently, law enforcement executives must make it a priority to create and 
enforce policies that do not tolerate such conduct from their employees and terminates 
them upon sustained allegations.  The policy should also require the law enforcement 
agency to conscientiously report such infractions to their local prosecuting jurisdictions.  
A multitude of media which included case law, articles, and other publications were 
reviewed for this subject matter and it is clear that the public demands ethical conduct 
from their law enforcement jurisdictions, without exception.  Law enforcement agencies 
must act accordingly towards any “Brady Officer” in order to maintain that expectation 
and must further ensure the timely reporting of those officers to their prosecuting 
jurisdictions. 
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More than ever, today’s law enforcement agencies in the United States, 
especially in Texas, have been subjected to probes, investigations, and inquiries from a 
multitude of special interest entities regarding the ethics of their agencies (Lisko, 2011).  
An old United States Supreme Court decision, handed down in 1963, seems to be 
wreaking havoc on law enforcement executives, especially within the last few years.  
The case decision is entitled Brady v. Maryland (1963).  Under this Supreme Court 
decision, it states that peace officers and prosecutors have an affirmative duty to 
disclose all exculpatory evidence to the accused, including peace officers with integrity 
issues (Braaten, 2011).  Subsequent case law Kyles v. Whitley (1995) expanded Brady 
v. Maryland, (1963) obligations to law enforcement to report officers who have been 
disciplined for untruthfulness or creditability issues to the prosecution, who are then 
required to turn that information over to the accused  (Lisko, 2011).        
The creditability of every witness, especially law enforcement officers, for the 
prosecution is subject to scrutiny by the defense (Van Brocklin, 2010).  Police officers 
who have been disciplined for lying or falsifying documents cannot be put on the stand 
to testify because they lack credibility.  To make matters worse, whether or not the 
prosecution was aware of the disciplinary record for untruthfulness by the law 
enforcement officer makes no difference (Van Brocklin, 2010).    
In 2009, an officer in a large metropolitan police department in Texas was 
discovered to have been disciplined over 15 years ago for falsifying an arrest report and 
other acts of untruthfulness (Eiserer, 2009).  The prosecuting jurisdiction was not aware 
of the discipline and the officer had testified in numerous cases.  The prosecution 
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discovered the infraction and the case was dismissed because “Brady” requirement to 
report the officer’s lack of creditability to the defense (Eiserer, 2009).  The prosecution 
in that jurisdiction is now having to go back and review all cases the officer testified in 
and those cases could ultimately end up being dismissed or overturned (Eiserer, 2009).  
Since 2005, the same exact situation played out in Oklahoma, Washington, Arizona, 
Massachuysetts, and California, where hundreds of cases were reviewed and 
subsequently dismissed because of failure to comply with Brady standards (Lisko, 
2011).  Each of the same agencies are also engaged in lawsuits from freed defendants 
who are suing on the grounds of not providing due process (Lisko, 2011).  Therefore, 
law enforcement agencies should terminate officers who have been disciplined for 
untruthfulness and provide the names of those officers to the prosecuting jurisdiction 
because of the officer’s lack of ability to testify in court. 
POSITION  
Although the Brady v. Maryland (1963) decisions were handed down in 1963, the 
ramifications of that decision can cause irrefutable damage if a law enforcement agency 
does not have a clear cut policy to be in compliance.  According to Braaten (2011), as 
law enforcement officers, there is no such thing as a little integrity; it is something one 
either has or does not have.  This simple mentality should be the norm for law 
enforcement agencies, but many agencies do not have a policy to address Brady 
issues.  Law enforcement agencies should have a clear cut policy for untruthfulness and 
the consequence of any untruthfulness is termination of employment (Braaten, 2011).  
This policy should also have clear plan of action for ensuring the information is turned 
over to the prosecution (Braaten, 2011).  Failure to take this kind of stance will not only 
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sabotage any court proceeding the officer may testify in, but will bring integrity questions 
for the entire department (Goldstein, 1975).   
Before further discussion can continue, it must be established what types of 
untruthfulness are and are not covered under Brady.  Untruthfulness that is within the 
scope of duty for the law enforcement officer is not covered under Brady (Albert & 
Noble, 2009).  This would include denigrations used in operations, interrogations, or 
apprehensions.  What Brady does cover are substained violations of unthruthfulness 
when not engauged in the above mentioned scenerios.  This would entale 
untruthfulness or falsifications on government documents, testimony, or during internal 
investigations (Albert & Noble, 2009).  Also included would be sustained violations of an 
officer’s failure to report criminal behavior from other officers when witnessed 
(McCormack, 1987).  This also known as maintaining “the code of silence” (Albert & 
Noble, 2009).   
The unavoidable reality of the Brady decision is that any law enforcement officer 
who has been disciplined for untruthfulness can no longer function in the same law 
enforcement capacity (Van Brocklin, 2010).  If an officer cannot testify in court, then 
they cannot take any enforcement action of any form.  Whether the infraction was 15 
years ago or 15 minutes ago, the fact that the infraction exists makes the law 
enforcement officer an un-credible witness (Lisko, 2011).  Agencies that allow 
employees to remain employed in the same capacity and/or do not report the infraction 
to the prosecution are not acting in good faith and lack credibility for the entire agency 
(Van Brocklin, 2010).  Understandably, it is a difficult decision to terminate an officer, 
especially if the violation was his or hers first disciplinary infraction (Eiserer, 2009).  
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Because it does not matter if the prosecution was aware of the infraction, the Brady 
decision will negate any testimony from the officer and could cause dangerous criminals 
to go free. 
Because of the clear ramifications to the contrary, a law enforcement agency’s 
policies should also be expanded to report any officer with truthfulness issues to the 
prosecuting attorney’s office so that “Brady” requirements can be met (Lisko, 2011).  
Some law enforcement agencies are finding out the hard way that the practice of 
remaining silent has not only brought corruption allegations, but opens the department 
up for civil liability for not operating in good faith (Albert & Noble, 2009).  In other words, 
doing nothing will guarantee current, past, or future court testimony being negated and 
department heads will be forced to explain why they did not communicate with the 
prosecution and allowed a convicted felon to go free.  Some law enforcement agencies 
have created and maintain a “Brady Watch List” to segment with the prosecutor’s office 
to keep an eye on officers who may have some Brady issues in order to keep the lines 
of communication open (Kamp & Nalder, 2008).        
COUNTER POSITION 
During research for this paper, two negative views surfaced regarding the 
aforementioned proposed standards.  The issue of civil service or other appeal process 
adopted by the respective jurisdiction will negate termination, and Brady requirements 
to furnish an officer’s disciplinary record rests solely on the prosecution.  The first 
negative view point has substance.  There are cases where law enforcement agencies 
have a clear and well defined policy and terminate officers for infractions of 
untruthfulness only to have the officer(s) reinstated because of civil service or other 
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appeal processes (Eiserer, 2009).  In this scenario, it would seem counterproductive to 
terminate an officer in this circumstance, only to have the officer reinstated afterwards.  
Some new department heads have, after shortly arriving to an agency and investigated 
the disciplinary files of all officers, later terminated officers who could not pass the Brady 
test (Lisko, 2011).  Many of the terminated officers got their jobs back on appeal. 
The other negative view point is that Brady v. Maryland (1963) only requires the 
prosecution to furnish the disciplinary record of an officer to the accused.  There are 
some law enforcement agencies who will aggressively oppose sharing their agency's 
disciplinary records with anyone (Van Derbeken, 2010).  Some law enforcement 
agencies may also take the stance that it is the prosecutors’ duty to check disciplinary 
records of all officers who are going to testify and failure to do is a result of derelict of 
duty on their part (Van Derbeken, 2010).  In simpler terms, if they (prosecutors) were 
not worried about it, then the law enforcement agencies should not be worried about it.  
It is surprising that many law enforcement agencies have no policy to address any of 
the aforementioned issues or some law enforcement executives may feel that their sole 
duty ends when handing down disciplinary action for issues of untruthfulness (Lisko, 
2011).                
Again, the first negative view point has its merits.  It is true that because of civil 
service or other appeal boards some officers who were terminated for untruthfulness 
did, in fact, get their jobs back and were re-instated with back pay(Eiserer, 2009).  
However, if a law enforcement agency is going to combat corruption and take a true 
strong stance on integrity, then the department head has no other alternative but to 
terminate the officer(s).  Department heads can control where the officer with Brady 
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issues is assigned after being re-instated (McCormack, 1987).  The department head 
would have no choice but to assign the officer to a position that did not require any 
enforcement action to be taken (McCormack, 1987).  This can seem frustrating and 
pointless, but this action will help remove any possible future civil litigation being levied 
against the law enforcement agency executive or the agency itself.  It is much easier for 
a law enforcement executive to defend against lawsuits when appropriate action was 
taken against an officer who had been caught lying, but due to a process beyond their 
control, the officer was reinstated (McCormack, 1987).  It would also be imperative that 
a formal reporting system to the prosecution’s office be in place (Lisko, 2011).  When a 
law enforcement agency takes the appropriate steps to be in compliance with Brady v. 
Maryland (1963), then the law enforcement agency can stand by the claim that the 
agency’s integrity will not be negotiable (Albert & Noble, 2009). 
The other counter view point that a law enforcement agency is not held 
accountable for not furnishing information to the prosecution when an officer has Brady 
concerns is more of myth than a fact.  It is true that many agencies have gotten away 
with not reporting Brady officers to the prosecution and that the issue has never 
surfaced (Eiserer, 2009).  However, it does not eradicate the fact that the agency is not 
in compliance with Brady .v Maryland (1963) and as stated earlier, it is inconsequential 
whether or not the prosecution was aware of an officer’s Brady issues before or after 
testimony in court (Lisko, 2011).  The fact the prosecution failed to furnish this 
information to the defense (or the accused) is indisputable.  The end result is that the 
defense has legal and valid claim to remove any testimony from the officer and, more 
importantly, have the case dismissed or reversed (Van Derbeken, 2010).  It is not hard 
 7 
to imagine what the consequences would be to a law enforcement agency should no 
systems and practices to address officers with Brady issues in place and a convicted 
criminal was released because Brady requirements were not met.  Pretending or hoping 
the aforementioned scenario never plays out is not realistic.  Law enforcement agencies 
are being inundated with open records request for officers’ disciplinary files from 
individuals and attorneys as a matter of routine (Eiserer, 2009).  If a department is not 
civil service, then the information must be released (Eiserer, 2009).  Defense attorneys 
are looking for explicatory information in officer’s personnel file that will benefit their 
client, while also waiting to see if the prosecution will furnish this information as required 
under Brady v. Maryland (1963) (Albert & Noble, 2009).  If this does not occur, the 
defense has a more than good chance of getting the case dismissed.  Civil service law 
enforcement agencies may be able to not release the disciplinary files under open 
records, but they are required to if they are subpoenaed (Eiserer, 2009).  Open records 
requests for officers’ personnel files has become a standard of normal practice for 
defense attorneys.  Attorneys across the nation are exploiting law enforcement 
agencies’ lack of compliance to Brady v. Maryland (1963) for their clients benefit and at 
law enforcement agencies’’ expense (Lisko, 2011).   
RECOMMENDATION 
The public has a reasonable expectation that law enforcement officers tell the 
truth when it comes to documents, statements, or testimony (Goldstein, 1975).  If a law 
enforcement agency does not demand the same expectation or retains officers who 
have been shown to not tell the truth, then the law enforcement agency can be 
legitimately labeled as unethical or corrupt (Goldstein, 1975).  During completion of this 
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research, one re-occurring theme continuously surfaced towards law enforcement 
executives on handling officers who have sustained acts of untruthfulness, and that was 
to unilaterally terminate that officer’s employment. This stance is based on the findings 
of Brady v. Maryland (1963) (Braaten, 2011).  Simply stated, if an officer has a 
sustained act of any form of untruthfulness, the officer can never testify in open court 
because of the high probability of being declared an un-creditable witness.  It is also the 
responsibility of law enforcement executives to ensure Brady officers are reported to the 
prosecutor’s office straightaway to prevent any past, present, and future cases from 
being sabotaged due to the prosecution’s lack of knowledge of the situation and later 
failing to provide the information to the defense (Lisko, 2011).               
Although Brady v. Maryland  (1963) is nearly 50 years old, many law 
enforcement agencies appear to not be aware of the full ramifications of not having a 
clear practice or policy for dealing with Brady officers.  Many law enforcement agencies 
that do have a clear and concise policy in place are only because the end result of 
ramifications for not following Brady v. Maryland (1963) in the first place (Lisko, 2011). 
Those agencies have endured high profile situations within the media and paid “lots of 
money” to defendants who later sued for lack of due process (Van Derbeken, 2010). 
The key to not having a high profile media event and subsequent lawsuits, like the ones 
mentioned, is prevention (Lisko, 2011).  A vibrant plan and practice can address all of 
the Brady requirements as well as address what to do if the officer’s terminated for 
untruthfulness, including assigning the re-instated officer to a duty that requires no 
enforcement actions, which is really the only option for law enforcement executives. 
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This policy and practice will identify what is Brady material, the consequence of 
termination for officers who commit Brady violations, and will require immediate 
notification of Brady material to the agency executive and prosecution (Lisko, 2011).  
Otherwise, law enforcement agencies who fail to act proactively with Brady v. Maryland 
(1963) will scramble to act reactively when negative implications begin to unfold 
(McCormack, 1987).   
Law enforcement executives who take the stance that they will not terminate 
Brady officers because of various appeals processes are missing the mark on ethical 
practices (McCormack, 1987).  Clearly, law enforcement executives who fail to 
terminate Brady officers subject the department to civil liability because criminal cases 
can be dismissed and jailed defendants can argue wrongful conviction.  Even worse, 
defendants who committed heinous acts can go free and re-offend or place a legitimate 
risk to the public.   
Law enforcement agencies that take the position that sole responsibility of 
fulfilling the requirements of Brady rests solely on the office of the prosecutor are sadly 
misinformed (Lisko, 2011).  One only needs to read the citation of Brady v. Maryland to 
understand that the responsibility to furnish the information is shared between law 
enforcement and the prosecution.  Even worse, law enforcement agencies that fail to 
furnish the information because of political or other similar reasons deserve questions of 
ethical practices for not have public’s safety as the highest priority (McCormack, 1987).   
It is common knowledge within the law enforcement community that the 
frequencies of open record requests for officers’ disciplinary records are at an 
unprecedented high.  This is partly because defense attorneys are capitalizing on law 
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enforcement agencies who fail to be proactive with their Brady requirements (Lisko, 
2011).  Any contradiction from law enforcement agencies to the proposed actions in 
regards to Brady v. Maryland (1963) will guarantee a proverbial can of worms to be 
opened, especially during a high profile criminal case.  This issue is important to the law 
enforcement community because not only is a law enforcement agency’s standing 
within the community at stake, but the issue of the public’s safety can be put at risk.  
Law enforcement executives should emulate the agency’s stance that the safety of the 
public and their trust in their officers is not and will not be negotiable (Goldstein, 1975). 
All it takes is one case to be dismissed because Brady requirements were not followed 
to undo all efforts to maintain the public’s trust a law enforcement agency has vigorously 
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